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INTRODUCTION
American government is in a period of turmoil and apparent change. Our
nation's recent failures, diplomatic and military, foreign and domestic, have
undermined confidence in existing institutions and practices. The executive
branch, in particular, is blamed for much of what has gone wrong. Recent
presidents are said to have exercised too much power over all forms of legis-
lation, controlled information to prevent criticism or legislative interference,
engaged in covert activities here and abroad, and made war without suffi-
ciently explicit legislative approval.
Congress has adopted unprecedented measures to check sweeping execu-
tive claims of power over foreign and military affairs. Most notable is the War
Powers Act.' Other measures have been considered, including proposals to
submit to the courts some conflicts between the legislative and executive over
access to information.' The courts have been busy deciding cases concerning
the division of powers, even without special legislative encouragement.3
* This paper is based on research conducted by Professor Sofaer as Director of the American
Bar Association sponsored study of the war powers in American history. The views expressed are
the sole responsibility of the author. For greater detail and disctIssion of the incidents described
herein. see A. SOFAER, W, AR. FOREIG.x AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976).
t Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. Joint Resolution of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148. 87 Stat. 555. Other notable examples
are the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of 1, 2, 31 U.S.C.); and the Antideficiency Act
of 1950, ch. 896, § 3679c(2), 64 Stat. 765, as ame ied, 31 U.S.C. § 665 (Supp. IV, 1974). The
executive's authority to impound under this statute has been strictly construed. State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe. 479 F.2d 1099. 1118 (8th Cir. 1973).
2. See S. 2073. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill has not been reintroduced.
3. The most striking example is United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638 (1974), in which a
unanimous Supreme Court refused to allow the President to decide unilaterally what information
to submit in response to a judicial subpoena. Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970), has also provided bases for litigation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
More recently, telephone surveillance of executive department officials by the Secretary of State
has been the subject of a civil action. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975);
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 21, col. 2. The issue of impoundment of funds appropriated by
Congress has also stimulated court activity. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (Im-
poundment Control Act does not permit allotment of less than entire amounts authorized to be
appropriated). See also, on the impoundment issue, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Pennsylvania v. Weinberger, 367 F. Supp. 1378 (D.D.C. 1973). The Vietnam
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This symposium is an attempt to focus on the present state of executive
power and to consider remedies for felt deficiencies or dangers. The sym-
posium understandably enlists people from many different fields and with a
broad spectrum of views on the crucial issues. They must all, to one degree or
another, invoke and rely upon past experience as a guide, just as Congress
and the courts use experience to devise or at least to rationalize proposed
solutions. Indeed, many politicians and writers, since the war in Vietnam,
have used history to explain or to justify what went wrong and to devise new
rules or institutions to deal with the problem of distributing power between
the executive and legislative branches.
The purpose of this paper is to deal with one recurrent use of history in
the current debate over our institutions of government. Again and again,
those critical of recent practices have invoked the experience of the Con-
stitution's framers.4 The first twenty to thirty years of experience under the
present Constitution are generally regarded as a period of national progress
and achievement, and modern critics strongly suggest that our early successes
may be attributed, at least in part, to the willingness of our first presidents to
abide by the Constitution.
5
An important example of this use of our early history is found in the
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, filed February 9, 1972,
War engendered a flurry of activity in the courts. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (reversing district court decision that there was not
sufficient authorization to warrant Cambodia bombings, oil ground that issue presented a politi-
cal question); Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (repeal of Tonkin Resolution did
not withdraw congressional authorization implicit in other legislation); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution held sufficient au-
thorization).
4. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., DOCUMENTS RELAT-
ING 'O THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND
THE WAR IN INDOCHINA 12-13, 74-76, 88, 99-101, 153-56 (Comm. Print 1970); Hearings on War
Powers Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (Thomas F. Eagleton), 209-12 (Raoul Berger) (1973);
Hearings on Congress, the President, and the War Powers Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 513-17 (1970)
(Harvard Lau, Resiew Legal Memorandum on the Constitutionality of the Amendment to End the
War); R. BERGER. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 78-81, 130-40, 167-81 (earlN
practice). 11-14, 35-42, 50-56, 61-69, 127-29, 146-49 (original intent) (1974); Ratner, The Coordi-
nated iWarmaking Power-Legislative, Executive, andJudicial Roles, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 461, 464 n. 12,
470 (1971): Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1260-61 (1969); Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (1972).
Those defending recent practices have also frequently invoked the framers' experiences to
support their arguments. See, e.g., Rogers, Congress, the President and the War Powers, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 1194-98 (1971); DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, supra at 176;
Hearings on War Powers, supra at 297 (Barry Goldwater). Edward Corwin raised many of these
arguments over half a century ago. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 90-97, 131-35 (1917).
5. See DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 30-31;
Hearinugs on War Powers. supra note 4, at 31-32 (statement of Thomas F. Eagleton).
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concerning an early version of the "war powers bill." The report flatly asserts
that "whatever else they may have painted with a 'broad brush,' the Framers
of the American Constitution were neither uncertain nor ambiguous about
where they wished to rest the authority to initiate war," namely "in the legisla-
ture, and in the legislature alone."16 The power to declare war and to control
the military resources placed at the nation's disposal are repeatedly cited as
reflecting an intent to require legislative approval before war is commenced.
Some commentators even argue that the Constitution meant to avoid the sort
of gradual involvement that occurred in Vietnam by requiring Congress to
declare war or to authorize it unequivocally, not just to delegate vague dis-
cretionary power over military actions or to pay for actions already
undertaken.7 Treaties committing the nation to come to the aid of others
represent, under this view, only a prediction by the President and Senate that
the Congress would, when faced with a situation contemplated in the treaty,
authorize hostilities in the constitutionally prescribed manner. The sole excep-
tion to the requirement of prior legislative approval, some assert, is the
President's power to defend the nation from actual, or perhaps also immi-
nent, attack.8 And this power is sometimes narrowly construed to limit its
application to attacks on the nation as a geographic entity, rather than on
ships and citizens abroad, and to preclude preemptive strikes.
The unambiguous allocation allegedly made by the framers was, according
to the theory I am addressing, faithfully followed by the same men when they
assumed power. No in-depth exposition of what actually occurred in the early
administrations is attempted to demonstrate this hypothesis. Rather, isolated
and-as I will show-unrepresentative and misleading events are relied upon,
such as Madison's argument in the Pacificus-Helvidius debate, Jefferson's
statement in his first annual address that Congress alone has the power to
authorize "offensive" military actions, and Madison's message of June 1, 1812,
asking Congress whether the United States should go to war with Britain-"a
6. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WAR POWERS, S. REP. No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1972).
7. See, e.g., ACLU Amicus Brief and Appellant's Brief, Orlando v. Laird, excerpted in L.
FRIEDMAN & B. NEUBORNE, UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO THE PRESIDENT, THE ACLU CASE
AGAINST THE ILLEGAL WAR IN VIET NAM 62-72, 130-74 (1972); Van Alstyne, supra note 4. at
16-17; Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdictionally Attackable, in 2
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 680-81 (R. Falk ed. 1969); cf. Bickel, Congress,
the President and thePowerto Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 137 (1971).
In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), the court held
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and other legislative collaborations to be sufficient authorization
for the war. Even after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed, the Second Circuit found
adequate authorization. See Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
969 (1972). See also Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
8. See, e.g., statement of Professor Richard B. Morris, in S. REP. No. 606, supra note 6, at 15;
Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 529, 612 (1974); Reveley, supra note 4, at 1285-88,
1290 n.55.
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solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative de-
partment of the Government.":'
Much can be gained, I think, by reviewing the highlights of our early
history to determine how the framers and their contemporaries actually
Viewed and exercised power. Enough has been said to establish that the con-
stitutional allocation of powers relating to war making is far from unambigu-
ous.1 Clearly, the Constitution accords Congress the upper hand, or final
say, on most issues of significance. But it also assigns the President great
powers over the military, and in the execution of policy. What needs closer
examination than it has so far received is the construction actually given the
Constitution's allocation during the first few administrations.
FORGING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1789-1797
Any in-depth treatment of the allocation of power over foreign and mili-
tary affairs in modern times necessarily leads to a discussion of the extent to
which the American executive controls other powers and functions that virtu-
ally assure him the power to make war or to lead the nation to war. The
presidency gains its war-making capacity not only from the power to con-
mand the military forces Congress provides but from its control of the con-
duct of foreign relations, including its capacity to obtain and to keep from
Congress information necessary for that body to formulate and to judge
foreign and military policy; from its extensive role in planning legislation,
including the budget; from the discretion it exercises over funds allocated by
the legislature; from its control over most important executive offices; and
perhaps most of all from the vast powers Congress has willingly delegated
that directly concern the use of military force.
The first lesson of George Washington's presidency is that the pattern of
executive-congressional relations that we associate with the modern executive
was established in all its essentials by 1797. This was accomplished, moreover,
with a remarkably high degree of awareness in the legislature of the enor-
mous power that the executive might acquire if allowed to assume the finc-
tions involved. One of the first decisions made by Congress, for example, was
to allow, or to recognize, the President's power to remove the principle execu-
9. Madison's papers as Helvidius are in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138-88 (G. Hunt
ed. 1906). Jefferson's statement is in 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 11. 12 (1801); and Madison's message is
in 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 1714, 1719 (1812).
10. The best and most balanced treatment is L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1972). Other able treatments include Bestor, supra note 8, at 537-66; Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution, The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972); Reveley,
Constitutional Allocation of the War Powers Between the President and Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J.
INT'L L. 73 (1974); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1772-80 (1968). My own coverage is in A. SOFAER,
WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSIrUIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS ch. 1 (1976).
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tive officers without cause. Many of those favoring this allocation rested their
case on an expansive construction of the power to execute the laws. As Mad-
ison described the prevailing argument: "[T]he Executive power being in
general terms vested in the President, all power of an Executive nature not
particularly taken away must belong to that department."'" The planning
function was quickly assumed by Washington, who ordered Secretary of War
Henry Knox to prepare a plan for organizing the militia;"2 Congress seemed
agreeable to this mode of proceeding when it included in the act establishing
the Treasury a requirement that the Secretary "digest and prepare plans"
concerning revenue and expenditures,' 3 and soon thereafter instructed Alex-
ander Hamilton to report a plan for supporting the public credit."' Republi-
cans forcefully challenged this practice when they increased their numbers in
the Second Congress, warning "that the Executive, or rather the Treasury
Department, was really the efficiet Legislature (f the country, so far as relates to
the revenue, which is the vital principle of Government. '"' But rather than
restricted, the practice was actually expanded to include planning for frontier
defense, with many legislators noting the superior capacity of executive offi-
cers to prepare plans in their respective areas of expertise.'
Congress quickly granted the executive broad control over funds by mak-
ing most appropriations in lump sums; by allowing the Secretaries of Trea-
sury and War to shift such funds as were specifically appropriated from one
category to another; by appropriating funds to cover deficiencies in categories
for which appropriations had been expended; and by ratifying expenditures
on authorized purposes for which no appropriation had been made, such as
the expedition to suppress the so-called Whiskey Rebellion. 7 Albert Gallatin's
opposition to these practices was as sophisticated and effective as an) that
could be mounted today, after almost two hundred years of experience.' 8 But
11. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 405-06 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). Madison noted that this doctrine was subject to mod-
ification but that he favored executive authority over removal to help preserve an equilibrium
against the far more awesome legislative power.
12. See I ANNALS Or CONG. 938 (1790). See also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2087-2107 (1790).
13. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65. For the related debate, see I ANNALS OF CONG.
615-31 (1789).
14. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 904 (1789).
15. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 351 (1792).
16. See particularly the statement of Theodore Sedgwick, of' Massachusetts, id. at 437-40, in-
cluding his response to Madison's contentions. A comprehensive statement by John Page, of Vir-
ginia, against such delegations appears in id. at 441-44. \lilitary planning was added to the list of
executive functions in 1795. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1120-21 (1795).
17. See generaly L. WHITE, THE FEDER ALISTS, A SITUDY" IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 326-29
(1961); L. WILMIERDING, THE SPENDING POWER, A HISTORY OF ITH_ EFFORTS OF CONGRESS TO
CONTROl EXPENDITURES 20-49 (1943). The Act of Dec. 31, 1794, ch. 6. I Stat. 404, appropriated
funds 1o cover expenses incurred in suppressing the insur rection.
18. For a sampling of Gallatin's arguments. see 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2336-42. 2348-51, 2358
(1797).
[Vol. 40: No. 2
Page 12: Spring 1976] PRACTICE UNDER THE FRAMERS
his minor successes proved futile in practice and were undone before
Washington's second term ended.1 9
Just as Congress allowed the executive broad fiscal discretion, it delegated
broad, undefined authority over foreign and military affairs .2 1 Legislators
recognized that to delegate without specificity on subjects like the suppression
of insurrections was both dangerous and an abdication of Congress' duty.2 t
But the only subject on which Congress consistently insisted on specificity was
the location of post roads, 22 which of course involved the allocation of con-
tracts for construction, maintenance, and related economic development.
Washington early decided, after cabinet discussion, that he possessed dis-
cretion to withhold information requested by Congress if its disclosure might
harm the nation's interests. 2  He actually exercised this power on two
occasions-once in response to an unqualified Senate request for certain dis-
patches from the minister to France, Gouverneur Morris, and once in re-
sponse to a House request for material relating to the Jay Treaty. 4 In the
second instance, he went so far as to assert that the House lacked power to
consider the merits of treaties duly ratified by the Senate, a position the
House majority resolved to reject. 25 Neither the House nor the Senate, how-
19. Gallatin succeeded in having included in the military appropriations for 1797 language to
the effect that sums specified -shall be solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively
appropriated." 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2349 (1797). The change was ineffectual in controlling mili-
tary spending, and was rejected the very next year. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 575; 8 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1874 (1798); L. X\\L.MERDIN;, supra note 17, at 44-45.
20. For example, on June 5. 1794, Washington was authorized to use land and naval forces to
keep foreign cruisers fitted out here in the United States from carrying on hostile action against a
state with whom this country was at peace, and to make foreign vessels depart when by the law of
nations or United States treaties they ought not to remain. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat.
384. In the Resolution of March 26, 1794, 1 Stat. 400, Congress authorized the President to
administer and enforce an embargo in the manner best adopted to give it "full effect." Most
significantly in the Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 44, 1 Stat. 372, the President was given virtually
complete discretion, dtiring the recess of Congress plus fifteen days, as to whether and when to
lay an embargo, the vessels to be covered, and the regulations to be adopted in its implementa-
tion. The Act of Sept. 29, 1789. ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95, 96, granted the President authority "to call
into service from time to time, such part of the militia ...as he uay judge necessary" to protect
the inhabitants of the frontiers from hostile incursions by Indians. Section 1 of the Act of May 9,
1794, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 367, authorized the President to require the states to have 80.000 effective
militia held "in readiness to march at a moment's warning." Discretion as to whether to build Up
to a certain number of naval vessels was delegated in Act of March 27. 1794, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350
and Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 376.
21. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 552-55 (1792) (debate on militia bill). Some legislators urged
greater specificity even for subjects of lesser importance. See, e.g,, I ANNALS OF CONG. 879-80
(1789) (debate about permanent seat of government).
22. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1527, 1640-41, 1676-77, 2295 (1790); 4 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1431-43
(1794); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2957 (1797).
23. See THE COMPLErE JEFFERSON 1222-23 (S. Padover ed. 1943); Sofaer. Book Review, 88
HARv. L. REv. 281, 289-90 (1974).
24. For a summary of these instances, see Sofaer, Executive Privilege.: An Historical N\ote, 75
COLUm. L. REV. 1318-21 (1975).
25. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771-72, 782-83 (1796).
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ever, challenged his claim that he could withhold information "for public
considerations.
2 6
The second major lesson of Washington's administration was that he as-
sumed the power to make unilateral decisions in foreign affairs that could have
led to war. The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 was not the first time
Washington and his cabinet decided that they could declare the nation's pol-
icy; they were ready to do so in 1790, during the Nootka Sound contro-
versy. 27 What the cabinet added in 1793 was its unanimous decision to dis-
pense with calling Congress into special session.2 8 Washington decided to con-
strue treaties to avoid apparent obligations to France, and to promulgate and
enforce regulations against American assistance to either the French or
British. His decision to delay consulting Congress until months after imple-
menting these policies was undoubtedly based on his apprehension, shared
even by Jefferson, that Congress might too readily be swayed by popular sup-
port for France. 29 While these decisions were being made and executed,
Hamilton and Madison engaged in a written debate as Pacificus and Hel-
vidius. Madison insisted that the President could not exercise even a specifi-
cally assigned power without calling Congress if its exercise could make war
more likely.30 This position, repeated as authority even today,3 was rejected
in practice by Washington and his entire cabinet, including Jefferson; and
when Congress convened, it overwhelmingly approved what Washington had
done.
3 2
26. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1794). An interesting contrast in this regard is Washington's
willingness to reveal all information demanded by Edmund Randolph in the personal dispute
that resulted from Randolph's dismissal from the cabinet. See J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON:
ANGUISH AND FAREWELL 234-39 (1972).
27. See 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 109-10 (J. Boyd ed. 1965). See also id. at 121,
127, 128-29, 135-36, 138-39, 141-42; 18 id. at 289-93; 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 53
(J. Hamilton ed. 1850).
28. Washington asked his cabinet whether Congress should be called back early, and they
voted against doing so. See 12 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 280-81 (W. Ford ed. 1891); 6
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 219 (P. Ford ed. 1895).
29. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 2, 1793), in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 277, 278-79. Two months later, on August 4, 1793, Jeffer-
son did argue that Congress should be convened earlier than scheduled. But he sought only a
starting day in early November, instead of the scheduled opening in December, "because while it
would gain a month in making provisions to prevent or prepare for war, it leaves such a space of
time for their assembling, as will avoid alarm either at home or abroad." Id. at 363. By that time,
the President's policies had been formulated and largely implemented. See generally C. THOMAS,
AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793, A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT (1931).
30. See 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 170-71, 182-83 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
31. See, e.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. RE'. 1, 17-25
(1972) (attempting to refute Hamilton's Pacificus position of a plenary executive power and sup-
porting generally Madison's Helvidius position); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1786-87 (1968)
(referring to any depldynment of troops by the executive).
32. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 17-18 (1793) (Senate); id. at 138-39 (House).
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II
UNDECLARED WAR AS CONSCIOUS NATIONAL POLICY
John Adams was a Federalist. As such, he was committed to the pattern of
executive-congressional relations established during Washington's tenure. On
the other hand, Adams lacked Washington's political strength. He faced a
hostile Congress throughout his term as President, dominated by Republicans,
who in general favored France over Britain. Consequently, when France per-
sisted in seizing American commerce, Adams realized that he would have
grave difficulty obtaining a declaration of war.
He specifically asked his cabinet in early 1798 whether he should seek a
declaration. Secretary of War James McHenry replied on February 15, after
being tutored by Hamilton, by then practicing law in New York.3 3 The people
were generally averse to war, he said, and a portion of them particularly averse
to war with France. He recommended, instead, an undeclared war as the
national policy: 34
An express declaration of hostility ... would subject us to all the chances
of evil which can accrue from the vengeance of a nation stimulated by ...
extraordinary success ...[a] mitigated hostility will [therefore] be the most
likely to fall in with the general feeling, while it leaves a door open for
negotiation and secures some chance to avoid some of the extremities of a
formal war.
Soon thereafter, Adams received firm evidence, in the so-called XYZ Papers,
that the ministers he had sent to France had been poorly treated and asked to
pay bribes. Once again, he asked his cabinet whether to recommend "an im-
mediate declaration of war. 35 At least one member urged such a rec-
ommendation, 6 but McHenry persisted in his view that a "qualified hostility"
was preferable to a formal declaration of war, since France had qualified its
hostility and had held out "terms of accomodation, tho' humiliating and inad-
missible in their present nature and form .... Such a procedure as this, while
it secures the objects essential and preparatory to a state of open war, involves
in it the fewest evils, and the greatest number of possible chances and advan-
33. See THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES McHENRY 291-95 (B. Steiner ed. 1907).
Hamilton replied in a detailed paper to McHenry's request of January 26 that Hamilton assist
him with "suggestions and opinions," since a "wrong policy" could be "extremely injurious," and
he, McHenry, could not "do justice to the subject," as Hamilton could. Id. at 291. McHenrx's
answer practically embodied the whole of Hamilton's letters. See ADAMS PAPERS, Mass. Hist. Soc'%
microfilm, pt. IV, reel 387, item 267.
34. ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 33.
35. 8 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 568 (C. Adams ed. 1856).
36. See Letter from Charles Lee to John Adams (Mar. 14, 1798), in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note
33 pt. IV, reel 387, item 218.
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tages." He advised that Congress be asked to set aside existing treaties with
France, and to provide the means for defense.3 '
Adams accepted McHenry's advice. The President announced to Congress
on March 19, 1798, that he had studied the dispatches and concluded there
was no ground to expect peace. He called again for defensive preparations
and unilaterally suspended the order he had issued restricting the arming of
merchant vessels. But he did not redquest a declaration of war.3 F
Republicans in Congress sensed the nation's drift toward war and began to
press for a definitive legislative determination of the question, hoping thereby
to avert the conflict. A resolution was proposed declaring it inexpedient "to
resort to war" with France. 3a Any chance that the resolution might pass was
destroyed, however, after Republicans successftIlly pressed Adams to reveal
the XYZ Papers. These dispatches shifted sentiment sharply against France,
and Congress proceeded to grant Adams the means and authority he sought
without a formal declaration. 41)
Even as the war raged, the case of Bas v. Tiogy reached the Supreme
Court, and the Justices unanimtIsly made known their view that "imperfect"
war, as they called it, was constitutionally permissible. 4t The Court held that
the Act of March 2, 1799, which authorized an award of one-half the value of
any American vessel seized from an "enemy," was applicable to a seizure frlom
a French privateer, even though Congress had not declared war. France was
an "enemyw," ruled the Court, because war existed in fact and because Con-
gress had France in mind when it passed the law in question. War did not
come in just one variety, wrote Justice Bushrod Washington: "[E]very conten-
tion bv force, between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of
their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.
'
"
42
Instead of perceiving danger in allowing Congress to authorize military
action without the public acquiescence that would usually be necessary to en-
gineer a declaration, Justice Chase praised Congress for proceeding piecemeal
in the face of public opposition: 43
"Fhe acts of congress have been analyzed, to show, that a war is not openly
denounced against France, ad that France is nowhere expressly called the
enem' of America: btt this only proves the circumspection and prudence of
the legislature. Considering our national prepossessions in favor of the
Frendh r epu)lic, congress had an atrItious task to perform. even in preparing
fot tiecessary dCfcnce and just retaliation. As the temper of the people rose.
however, in resentment of accunlUlated \orxongs, the language and the inea-
37. See Letter from jamcs \lcHenrv to john Adams (Mat. 14. 1798), in id. at reel 387, item
270.
38. See 8 ANN.xALS OF CoNc,. 1271-72 (1798).
39. See id. at 1319.
40. See tle cluster of statutes in I Stat. 552-65.
41. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 45.
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sures of the government became more and more energetic and indignant;
though hitherto the popular feeling may not have been ripe for a solemn
declaration of war; and an active and powerful opposition in our public coun-
cils, has postponed, if not prevented, that decisive event, which many thought
would have best suited the interest, as well as the honor, of the United States.
He even compared "the progress of our contest with France" with "the prog-
ress of out revolutionary contest; in which, watching the current of public
sentiment, the patriots of that day proceeded, step by step," from supplication
to "the bold and noble declaration of national independence. 44
In conclusion, the Quasi War was undeclared by design. It was undeclared
primarily because of the executive's need to avoid the risk of alienating a
large segment of Congress and the American people. Congress eventually
went along with the President, and the Supreme Court approved the constitu-
tionality of "imperfect" war, stating that Congress could make war by degrees
if it chose to do so.
III
THE INGLORIOUS "REVOLUTION OF 1800"
Thomas Jefferson hailed his victory over John Adams as the "Revolution
of 1800." This dramatic phrase was used to symbolize the triumph of Repub-
lican over Federalist ideology.
In addition to advocating strict construction of all powers conferred upon
the federal government and leaving matters other than foreign affairs to the
states, Republicans called for a reallocation of power from the federal execu-
tive to Congress. They had objected, during the period of Federalist control,
to executive planning and to statutes assigning broad powers to the President
to conduct military and foreign affairs. They had battled for greater control
of expenditures through specific appropriations. They had insisted on Con-
gress' right to information in the President's control. Many of them had
claimed that Congress should be consulted as soon as possible on issues relat-
ing to its specifically assigned powers, including the power to declare war.
The election of 1800 swept these Republicans into control of the nation and
therefore promised a major overhaul in the pattern of executive-congressional
relations established under Washington and Adans.
Events during Jefferson's two terms clearly demonstrate that the allocation
of power between Congress and the executive changed little, if at all, from
the pattern established in the first two administrations. As Leonard White says
in his excellent work, The Jeffersonians, "Jefferson fully maintained in practice
the Federalist conception of the executive power." '45 In fact, it seems fair to
44. Id.
45. L. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1801-1829, at 30
(1959).
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say that Jefferson's commitment to Republican doctrine may have been partly
responsible for his adopting and advancing practices far more dangerous to
the balance of power among the branches than conventional Federalist ide-
ology.
Executive planning continued unabated." The House initiated an inves-
tigation of spending practices, but no attempt to reform those practices was
made; deficit spending became a way of life for the armed services.4 7 Jeffer-
son went further than his predecessors in this regard after the attack on the
American frigate Chesapeake by the British warship Leopard. He ordered
purchases of arms and ammunition even though Congress had neither ap-
proved such expenditures nor appropriated funds for the purpose. He con-
sidered, but decided against, calling Congress back into session, undoubtedly
because he wished to avoid a legislative drive for immediate war against
Britain.4 8 The similarity to Washington's failure to call a special session in
1793 is apparent. Jefferson added a new element, however. Rather than at-
tempting to legitimize his orders under the Constitution, he justified the
purchases on the ground of emergency, trusting in the legislature to condone
his conduct. Congress overwhelmingly appropriated the funds to cover the
purchases, some noting, in effect, that "the safety of the nation is the supreme
law." 49 John Randolph sought to remind his Republican colleagues that Jef-
ferson should have called Congress into session while "they would have felt a
deep and particular sense of national indignity,"' " but others condoned
Jefferson's postponing the meeting "till the fermentation should have
subsided." 5 1
Broad delegations continued to be made, causing Republican Representa-
tive Richard Stanford, of North Carolina, to "ask how it will be possible, in a
46. On December 22, 1801, for example, John Randolph moved that the House direct the
Secretary of War to prepare a statement of the present military establishment, along with an
estimate of necessary posts and men for each garrison. The House agreed without opposition. See
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 348-49 (1801). Similar motions had been intensely opposed during
Washington's administration.
47. See generalt L. WILMERDING, supra note 17, at 26; L. WHITE, supra note 45, at 115-16. See
also II ANNALS OF CONG. 1285 (1802); 12 ANNALS Or CONG. 290 (1802), after which the investiga-
tion lapsed.
48. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 14-18 (1807).
49. Id. at 848 (Gardenier). See also id. at 832 (Montgomery), 840 (Alston).
50. Id. at 830. Referring to Representative Montgomery's argument based on emergency,
Randolph- said: "The more he magnified the danger of the crisis, to justify an illegal and uncon-
stitutional expenditure of the public money, the more clearly did he demonstrate the necessity
for convening Congress." Id. at 837.
51. Id. at 826 (Smilie). Smilie said he was more temperate than Randolph, and "alluded to an
ancient nation, who were wont to discuss great national questions twice, once when they were
drunk, that they might not want spirit, and once when they were sober, that they might not be
deficient in prudence." He suggested that Jefferson's decision had saved them from being "tinder
the immediate influence of passion." Id. at 830. W. Alston concurred: "We are now better pre-
pared to decide . . .and if by this prudent course war had been averted, the voice of the nation
woulcl approve it." Id. at 840.
[Vol. 40: No. 2
PRACTICE UNDER THE FRAMERS
few years, for any political observer or historian to draw a line of distinction
between parties.", 2 Jefferson's legislative leader, William Branch Giles, re-
sponded by citing precedents, many of which he and other Republicans had
previously opposed, and observing that the line between executive and legisla-
tive power was impossible to fix. He described the delegation issue as "an old
and abstract question, often heretofore brought into view, and leads to end-
less discussion." He was "unwilling to look into retrospection; it could only
produce an unpleasant and unprofitable examination. . . . I would rather
follow the example of a celebrated Roman conqueror. It was his maxim al-
ways to forget the last defeat, and to turn his whole thoughts upon the best
means of obtaining victory in the next battle.15 3
Jefferson on several occasions indicated his belief that he could withhold
information from Congress if its disclosure would harm the nation,"4 but he
never explicitly refused Congress material, except where the relevant request
was qualified to allow wvithholding.55 His behavior in this regard cannot, how-
ever, be attributed to any conviction on his part that Congress was entitled to
all important information in his control. One reason he was able to avoid
invoking some form of "executive privilege" was the enormous control he
exercised over Congress through his party leadership. Motions to request in-
formation on sensitive or potentially embarrassing subjects were repeatedly
voted down by the Republican majorities in both Houses. 56 The other reason
52. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1808). Rep. Richard Stanford, of North Carolina, said: "It was
once a fashion with us to object to that of giving the President discretion to raise, or not raise, an
armsy." Id. at 1950.
53. 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 259 (1808).
54. For example, Jefferson wrote to William Giles that he regarded a resolution that would
have requested his reasons for refitting the French vessel Berceau as improper, and said if a
resolution "'is passed on ground not legitimate. out duty will be to resist it." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to William Giles (Apr. 6, 1802), in 8 WRITINGS OF THOtAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at
142. The House, on January II, 1808, passed a request for material relating to whether any
officer of the United States had received money from anv foreign government, after Josiah
Quincy unsuccessfully objected to the lack of a qualification allowing the President to withhold
"confidential" correspondence. See 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1460 (1808). Jefferson responded on
January 15 that "he would give to the House such information not improper to be disclosed." Id.
at 1464. In responding to requests from both Houses of Congress for copies of all decrees and
acts promulgated since 1791 by the belligerent European powers affecting the commercial rights
of the United States, Jefferson sent the decrees that could be obtained "and are supposed to have
entered into the views of" each House. 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 299, 908 (1808). See also the several
claims by Jefferson of power to withhold material from the court in the Burr conspiracy trial,
discussed in Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 24 n.60 (1974), and
authorities cited therein.
55. See, e.g., 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 67-68, 70-71 (1806) (Senate motion requesting President to
supply copy of letter from Monroe to Madison, amended January 21, 1806, to specify date and to
qualify request for disclosure "if he shall judge the same to be proper"); id. at 71 (letter pro-
vided); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 336 (1807) (House request for information relating to Burr conspi-
racy "in possession of the Executive, except such as he may deem the public welfare to require
not to be disclosed"); id. at 39-43 (much information withheld).
56. See, e.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 200-62 (1803) (Senate refusal to request information on
measures taken by President pursuant to law authorizing military action, cost of same, and the
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he avoided confronting Congress with a claim of privilege was, simply stated,
his readiness to withhold material without letting the legislature know of its
existence. He established a system of dual correspondence that went far
beyond anything his predecessors practiced, under which public, official
communications were classified as "private" in order to keep them out of offi-
cial files.57 He promised confidentiality to his informants and never materially
breached the confidence they placed in him. 8 When subpoenaed during the
trials of Aaron Burr, he not only sought to invoke a discretion to withhold
information, he also secretly withheld material potentially useful to Burr
without even informing his own lawyers of its existence. 59
ftutrther legislation necessary to end wsat- with Tripoli): id. at 385-419 (House refusal to request
copies of treaties between France and Spain, and available correspondence, tending to determine
whether France had acquired title to Louisiana).
57. Soon after taking office, Jefferson sent the American Minister in France, Robert R.
Livingston, a code for deciphering future messages. Why a cipher between us. asked Jefferson
rhetorically, since official things go naturally to the Secretary of State and things not political
need no cipher? Because, Jefferson explained. information falls into three categories:
1. [M]atters of a public nature, and proper to go on our records, should go to the
secretary of state. 2. [M]atters of a public nature not proper to be placed on our records
may still go to the secretary of state, headed by the wvord -private.- Btt 3. there max be
matters merely personal to ourselves. and which require the cover of a cipher more than
those of any other character. [This latter category,] and others which we cannot foresee
may render it convenient and advantageous to have at hand a mask for whatever may
need it.
This letter of April 18. 1802, was apparently one for which the cipher would norniallv be used:
but "writing by Mr. Dupont I need no cipher," Jefferson said. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Robert Livingston (Apr. 18, 1802), in 8 WRITINGS OF THOxAS JEFFERSON. supia note 28, at 143-45.
The categories outlined by Jefferson in this extraordinary letter are susceptible to his labels of
"public." .private," and "personal" only if the words are deprived of ordinary meaning. The
letter itself makes clear that some matters of a "public nature" should be marked "private" and
kept out of "our records." And in calling matter in the third category "imerely personal." Jeffer-
son seems clearly to have been referring to the fact that he %%allted such information kept strictly
between Livingston and himself, rather than attempting to describe the nature of the infornation
in the letters. The April 18 letter most assuredly dealt with "public" rather than "personal" isat-
ters. It noted that Madison had written fully to Livingston concerning the question of Louisiana.
but continued that Jefferson could not "forbear recurring to it personally." He told Livingston
-in a now famous phrase-that the nation that holds New Orleans is "our natural and habitual
enesy," and if France takes possession, it might force the United States to ally with Britain. This
prediction of war, meant to gtide Livingston, was certainly not "personal" in the ordinary sense.
It was ats official letter. about an important public matter. that Jefferson wsanted kept secret.
58. For example, in a letter to Joseph Daveiss, the federal attorney for Kentuck v, on FebrIuary
15, 1806, Jeffetrson requested additional information concerning Aaron Burr's alleged activities
and promised to keep such conmmunications secret, at least until atrtest becase necessary, and
even then Jefferson pledged to withhold the source of his information. See 10 THE WRRtINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 231-32 (Fed. ed. 1904).
59. Chief Justice John Marshall issued a subpoena on June 13, 1807, at Burr's request, calling
upon Jefferson and others to submit a letter from General James Wilkinson to Jefferson. dated
October 21, 1806, to which Jefferson had referred in his message to Congress of January 22,
1807. See 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 39-43 (1807). A major dispute erupted over Jefferson's obligation
to produce the letter explicitly described in the subpoena, which has been widely discussed. The
subpoena also called, however, for "the documents accompanying the same letter," as swell as anN'
reply. Subpoena duces tecum In re United States v. Aaron Burr (E.D. Va.) (kindly supplied to the
author, and on file with, Professor Dumas Malone, Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
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Jefferson's most important military involvements concerned the so-called
Barbary States. Repeated seizures of American commerce by the pirates of
Tripoli, Morocco, and other Mediterranean powers led Jefferson to follow
Adams' example by dispatching a squadron of public vessels to the area. An-
ticipating that one or more of these nations might declare or make war upon
Americans, Jefferson asked his cabinet what form of instructions he should
issue to the squadron's commander, Richard Dale. The cabinet almost unani-
mousI agreed that, if war was either declared or made upon Americans, Dale
cotild be permitted to act offensively against the nation that had declared or
made war." Instructions were issued authorizing Dale to sink, burn, capture,
or destroy vessels attacking Americans," and Dale ordered the commanding
officers in his squadron to act accordingly .*2
The specific orders Dale isstued to one of his officers, Lieutenant Andrew
Sterrett, have taken on special historical significance. Sterrett commanded the
Eterprise, a twelve-gun schooner that acted as tender vessel to Dale's squiad-
ron. Sterrett was told on July 30, 1801, after Tripoli had declared war, to sail
to Malta from nearby Tripoli to obtain water. Dale knew Sterrett might meet
and engage Tripolitan vessels. He therefore issued instructions that ordered
Sterrett to disarm and release vessels Sterrett was able to conquer on the way
to Malta, but that allowed Sterrett to seize such vessels on his way back from
Malta." Sterrett met and defeated a fourteen-gun Tripolitan cruiser on his
way to Malta and, acting in accordance with Dale's instructions, disarmed and
released it.6 4
Jefferson had received a full report of Sterrett's victory by December 8,
1801, when he delivered his first annual message to Congress.155 He reported
Jefferson failed to reveal that the letter had, in fact, been accompanied by another. "confidential"
letter of the same date and a memorandum purporting to discuss the conspiracy, both of which
would have been useful to Burr in undermining Wilkinson's credibility. These documents appear
in 2 J. WItKiNSON, MEXMOIRS OF MY OwN TistEs app. xcv (1816). See discussion in 5 D. MALONE,
JEFFERSON AND His TIIE, SECOND TERM 1805-1809, at 248-49, 325 n.35 (1974).
60. See I VRTINcS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 58, at 365-66. The sole dissenter was
Levi Lincoln.
61. See I NAVAL DocuMENis RELATED TO THE UNIED STATES WARS WITH THE BARBARY
POWERS 465-67 (1939) [hereinafter cited as NAVAL DOcuMENTS].
62. See, e.g., Orders fron Richard Dale to Santel Barron. Jttly 4. 1801. in I NAVAL
DocUMENiS 500, and July 9. 1801, in id. at 505; Orders from Richard Dale to Andrew Sterrett.
July 5, 1801, in id. at 503, and July 30, 1801, in id. at 534-35.
63. Dale wrote Sterrett that he should return froln Malta "as soon as possible" and "not chace
out of your way particularly in going, as you have not much water on board." Id. at 534. Dale
continued that if Sterrett fell in with a Tripolitan corsair on his way to Malta that he could
manage, he should heave its guns overboard, cut its masts, and leave it just able to manage to get
to port. If the encounter occurred on the way back from Malta, Sterrett was to "bring her with
you if you think you can doe it with safety but on no accotnt run any risque of your vessel or the
health of your Crew ." Id. at 535.
64. R. IRWIN, THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE BARBARY POWERS
109-10 (1931).
65. Sterrett had returned to Washington City, as it was then called, by November 17, with
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on Sterrett's encounter in a repeatedly quoted passage, attributing the release
of the Tripolitan vessel to constitutional rather than tactical considerations: 6 6
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go
beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing
further hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The Legislature will doubtless
consider whether, by authorizing measures of offence also, they will place our
force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries. I communicate all ma-
terial information on this subject, that, in the exercise of this important func-
tion confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively, their judg-
ment may form itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance
of weight.
Most commentators have accepted this famous statement of deference to
Congress' power as accurate and made in good faith.67 Actually, as we have
seen, the cabinet had authorized offensive actions, and Dale had been in-
structed accordingly. Sterrett had released the corsair only because he was on
his way to Malta, rather than on his way back, as he had been instructed by
Dale. This fact would have been clear to Congress had Jefferson indeed
commtnicated "all material information," as he said he would. By the time of
his message, Sterrett had returned to the United States and had provided the
full story of his encounter, including the true reasons he had released the
corsair.6 8 This part of the story was withheld from Congress.
These facts undermine the importance so widely attributed to Jefferson's
statement to Congress regarding Sterrett's conduct. But the orders issued to
Dale, even as broadly construed, seem constitutionally defensible under even
a relatively narrow view of executive power. One can reasonably infer from
the power to defend against attacks on the United States-universally held to
be granted by the framers-a power to act offensively against any nation that
declared or made war. This was the view adopted by both Gallatin and
Hamilton, and probably by Madison as well."
We should well ask, therefore, why Jefferson suggested to Congress that
he lacked authority to act offensively against a nation that had, in fact, both
declared and made war on the United States.
Jefferson's message suggests an answer. He specifically asked for authority
dispatches and a report on the incident. See article from the National Intelligencer, reprinted in 1
NAVAL DOCUMENTS 538-39, attributing Sterrett's release of the vessel to his sense of mercy.
66. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 12 (1801).
67. See, e.g., C. BERDAHL, THE WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 63
(1921); R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 80; E. CORWIN, supra note 4, at 131-33; 4 D. MALONE,
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 98-99 (1970); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771,
1779 (1968).
68. Jefferson sent Congress, after some delay, the instructions issued to Dale, and Sterrett's
description of the encounter, but not the latter's orders from Dale. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 701,
734-39 (1801).
69. See Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 1802), in I WRITINGS OF
ALBERT GALLATIN 104-05 (H. Adams ed. 1960); 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
27, at 746-47; 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 366.
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for "measures of offense," the granting of which he undoubtedly realized
would enable him to dispatch expeditions such as Dale's without basing their
legality on the mere fact that vessels of war had been constructed and placed
within his power to utilize.' In this manner, he could also share with Con-
gress responsibility for the increased intensity with which the war was to be
conducted.
If Jefferson's description of Sterrett's conduct was intended to cause Con-
gress to authorize offensive actions, he certainly succeeded. After meager de-
bate, Congress adopted an act that gave explicit authority to the President to
capture and make prizes of any Tripolitan vessel, and in sweeping terms "to
cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of
war will justify, and may, in his opinion, require."71 Congress thereby con-
tinued, this time without recorded objection, the practice adopted during the
Quasi War of authorizing hostilities without formally declaring war. And the
authorization concerning Tripoli was surely as broad and as vague as the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution, passed after questionable executive representations in
1964.72
It was not long before Jefferson used the power delegated to him by Con-
gress to implement a plan that could not have been anticipated when the
delegation was made. The plan has an eerie familiarity today. But in 1801, it
was unprecedented. An elder brother of the Pasha of Tripoli, it seems, was
willing to promise great concessions if the United States were to assist him in
obtaining the throne. James L. Cathcart, American consul at Tripoli, sug-
gested to Madison, in a letter dated July 2, 1801, the possibility of "cdethron-
ing the present Bashaw, and effecting a revolution in favor of his brother
Hamet, who is at Tunis, and thereby insure the United States the gratitude of
him and his successors."7 3 Implementation of the plan was delayed for over a
year, because Hamet was temporarily reconciled with his brother. William
Eaton, consul at Tunis, convinced Hamet to switch allegiances, however, and
by August 1802 Madison was called upon to decide whether to allow the plan
to go forward.
Madison noted in a letter to Cathcart how difficult it would be to judge
and manage the project from so great a distance. He also added that "it does
not accord with the general sentiments or view of the United States to inter-
meddle with the domestic controversies of other countries." But he could not
70. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 12 (1801). The cruise was justified by the Secretary of the Navy
to Dale under the law "providing for a Naval Peace Establishment," apparently on the assumption
that at least a training exercise was implicitly authorized by legislation merely providing the
forces. See Act of Mar. 3, 1801, ch. 20, § 2, 2 Stat. 110; Order from Samuel Smith to Richard
Dale (May 20, 1801), in I NAVAL DOCUMENTS 463, 465.
71. Act of Feb. 6, 1802, ch. 4, § 2,2 Stat. 129, 130.
72. See generally Joint Resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
73. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 704 (1807).
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resist the opportunity-"it cannot be unfair, in the prosecution of a just war,
or the accomplishment of a reasonable peace, to take advantage of the hostile
cooperation of others," he wrote. "'As far, therefore, as the views of the
brother may contribute to otir success, the aid of them may be used for the
purpose.- He anticipated the possibility that Hamet's object might be unat-
tainable, and stated that the honor of the United States and "the expectations
he will have naturally formed" would reqjuire America -to treat his disap-
pointment with much tenderness; and to restore him, as nearly as may be, to
the sittation from which he was drawn.17 4 Hamet, in other words, was to be
used for "our success," but, as Secretary of the Navy Smith ordered Commo-
clore Morris on August 28, Hamet was not to be an obstacle to achieving an
acceptable peace with Tri polIi. 7
After considerable delay, the plan was put into operation with full cabinet
approval.71 Commodore Samuel Barron, in charge of the Mediterranean
squadron, ordered Captain Isaac Hull in writing to take his vessel, the Argus,
to Alexandria for refitting and other innocuous purposes. Actually, HIll's
true orders wvere verbal, the written ones being "intended to disguise the real
object of your expedition," said Barron, "which is to proceed with Mr. Eaton
to Alexandria, in search of Hamet-and to convey him and his unit" to such
'place on the coast as may be determined the most proper for cooperating
with the naval force under imx command." Hull was authorized to assure
Hamet of Barron's "most effectual' cooperation "against the usurper" and in
reestablishing Hamet as Pasha.7 7
The army Eaton and Hamet put together consisted of a handIful of
Americans, some Greek mercenaries, and about two thousand Arabs, with
their women and children, all hired for the ptnrpose. This motley conglomera-
tion managed to conquer Derne, but Eaton reported that he had already
spent $30,000, or $10,000 more than had been authorized by the administra-
tion. Eaton felt victor was certainly obtainable, but cautioned Barron that
Hamet and his men lacked the ability, following, and resources to take Tripoli
without further, substantial American military and fiscal support.78
Hamet's expedition apparently convinced his brother Joseph to seek
peace, and Barron decided to clunp Hamet in exchange for a favorable
treat ,." Eaton managed, however, to evacuate Hamet and his retinue, the
74. Letter from James Madison to James Cathcart (Aug. 22, 1802), in id. at 709.
75. Letter from Secretary of Navy Robert Smith to Commodore Richard Morris (Aug. 28.
1802), in R. MORRIS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONDUCT OF COMMODORE MORRIS DURING His COMMAND
IN THE M'EDITERRANEAN 45 (1804).
76. See I THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 58, at 382.
77. Letter from Samuel Barron to Isaac Hull (Sept. 13, 1804), and transcription of verbal
orders of Barron to Hull (Sept. 15. 1804). in 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 713-14 (1807).
78. Letter from William Eaton to Salmuel Barron (Apr. 29 and Max 1, 1806) (extract and (late
in error), in id. at 731-34.
79. See R. IRWIN, suipr note 64, at 149-53.
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Greeks and the Americans, in a scene that, as Eaton described it, brings to
mind recent events at the United States consulate in Saigon: '
[A]ll the Constellition's boats were laid along side our wharf. I ordered the
Captain of cannoniers to embark his company with the field pieces and a ten
inch howitzer which fell into our hands on the 27th of April; and after them
the Greek company. This was executed with silence and alacrity; but with
astonishment. The marines remained at their posts. When the boats were seen
returning I sent a messenger to the Bashaw requesting an interview. Under-
standing the purport of this message, he immediately repaired to the fort
wvith his retinue; dismounted, and embarked in the boats. The marines fol-
lowed with the American officers. When all were securely off, I stepped into a
small hoat which I had retained for the putrpose. and had just time to save mv
distance when the shore, out camp, anld the battery, were crowded with the
distracted soldiery and populace; some calling on the Bashaw; some on me;
Some utt ering shrieks: some execrations! Finding We Were out of reach, they
fell upon out tents and horses, which were left standing: carried them off.
and prepared themselves for flight.
Eaton returned to America a hero, and was handsomely rewarded. Hamet
applied to Jefferson for relief, basing his claim in part on an alleged commit-
ment to place him on the throne. After considerable debate, Hamet received
a small payiment.8 No legislator questioned the legality or propriety of the
joint action with Hamet. Everyone apparently assumed that the sweeping del-
egation, granted in response to Jefferson's report of Sterrett's encounter, ex-
tended to the plan to make Hamet the Pasha. The only significant complaint
heard in Congress was that the President had reneged on his alliance with
Hamet, not that he had made one. "
We can therefore sa', in retrospect, that the doctrinal differences that
separated Jefferson and his party from the Federalists failed to deter the
former frot exercising power in the same manner as a strong Federalist pres-
ident, backed by a legislative majority. Vigorous, inventive leadership was part
of Jefferson's nature. By 1807, he had arrived at a construction of the execu-
tive clause that amounted to a complete justification for adopting any mea-
sure necessary to accomplish a legitimate end: "[1I]f means specified by an act
are impracticable," he said, "the constitutional power to carry laws into execut-
tion remains, and supplies them."8 3
We shottld hardly complain, however, that he largely ignored the constitu-
tional straight-jacket he had inflicted upon himself. His achievements were
substantial and of lasting value. But his doctrinal leanings may well have ac-
80. Letter from William Eaton to Commodore John Rodgers (June 13, 1805), in C. PRENTISS,
THE LIFE OF THE LATE GENERAL WILLIAM EATON 362-63 (1813).
81. R. IRWIN, supra note 64, at 160; 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1106 (1806) (bill authorizing pay-
ment to Hamet of $2,400); id. at 185-88 (report critical of abandoning Hamet).
82. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 185, 187-88 (1806).
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. William H. Cabell (Aug. 11, 1807), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 58, at 441 n.
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counted in part for the creation of new practices and claims that constitute a
heritage of questionable value. Thus, instead of openly assuming and exercis-
ing a power to withhold material for public considerations, as Washington
had done, Jefferson seems to have preferred to avoid potential doctrinal con-
frontations and legislative interference by simply keeping Congress-and in
the Burr trial, a federal court-ignorant of information within his possession
or control. And, instead of modifying Republican doctrine to legitimize his
conduct after the Chesapeake affair, or the legislative absorption of the
Louisiana Territory,8 4 he applied the doctrine of emergency power in a man-
ner that allowed an escape from virtually all constitutional restraints. These
new developments may have had little real importance in Jefferson's time,
since most of his conduct could be rationalized under a more robust, but
precedented, view of executive authority. Nothing prevented future Presi-
dents, however, from using the powers developed by Jefferson in situations
far less conventional than those in which he had invoked them.
IV
EXECUTIVE W'7AR MAKING, 1809-1812
The administrations of James Madison and James Monroe are even richer
in material relating to war making than those of their predecessors. Close
scrutiny of all that material is unnecessary in this presentation. These are
famous Presidents, whose terms covered a period during which the United
States grew and became stronger. Madison and Monroe properly reap the
credit due them for the important developments that took place tinder their
stewardship. We have lost much of the flavor of these men, however, in the
adulatory descriptions with which most historians have provided us. A brief
look at some of their activities in the Floridas should contribute to filling out
our understanding of them as wielders of executive power.
A. West Florida
Jefferson had claimed that \Vest Florida-roughly the area to the west of
present-day Florida and to the east of Baton Rouge-had been transferred to
the United States as part of the Louisiana Purchase. Congress authorized Jef-
84. In connection with his departure from his own scruples concerning the absorption of
Louisiana, Jefferson said:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good
citizen, but is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self preservation, of saving our
country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and
all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 279. See also id. at 281.
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ferson, in general terms, to take possession of the area ceded by France. ' He
was prepared at the time to seize at least parts of West Florida, if Spain re-
fused to surrender New Orleans .8  Spain ceded New Orleans, however, and
was left in control of the contested area. In 1804 Congress authorized Jeffer-
son, when he deemed it expedient, to establish a customs district at Mobile, at
the very heart of West Florida. 7 Spain became acutely concerned, and Sec-
retary of State Madison assured them that the act would be applied only
within "the acknowledged limits of the United States," unless Spain itself
agreed to cede the territory.8 8 Despite these conciliatory gestures, Jefferson
was privately resolved to ac(1uire not only West Florida but East Florida as
well, "probably" Cuba, and apparently even NIexico. "
Soon after Madison became President, \William Claiborne, Governor of the
Orleans Territory, reported that West Florida was ripe for ac(Iu isition by the
United States.' During the stImmer of 1810, Claiborne travelled to the na-
tional capitol, apparently for discussions with Madison and Robert Smith, Sec-
retary of State. From Washington, Claiborne wrote an extraordinarily impor-
tant letter on June 14 to William Wykoff, Jr., a judge of the parish at West
Baton Rouge, describing America's acquisition of West Florida as inevitable.
He was "persuaded under present circumstances," however, that "it would be
more pleasing that the taking possession of the Country, be preceded by a
Request frlom the Inhabitants. -Can no means be devised to obtait such
Request?" He told Wykoff that while "the most. eligible means of obtaining an
expression of the wish of the Inhabitants of Florida, can best be determined
by themselves," it would be "more satisfactory- if clone through the medium
85. Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 245.
86. Jefferson had, in fact, prior to congressional passage of the authorizing Act of Oct. 31,
1803, ordered, by his Secretary of War, that preparedness measures be taken should any "serious
opposition take place"; that in furtherance of this object "Boats, provisions, field Pieces, [etc. to
be placed] in readiness: not only for regular Troops in the Terr but also for at least 500 of the
best militia (who if necessary should be engaged tr 3 months)." He did acknowledge that
nothing could be done relating to the militia, "excepting the forming a system.' Letter from Sec-
retary of War Henry Dearborn to James Wilkinson (Oct. 5, 1803), in 9 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF
THE UNITED STATES 71 (C. Carter ed. 1940). Orders were also sent to the commanding officer at
Chickasaw Bluffs on the same date to be ready to move down, at the shortest notice. Id. at 71
n.86. Additional orders, of the same date as the authorizing act, instructed Wilkinson to take
Baton Rouge, an area only disputably encompassed by the Louisiana Purchase, if he encountered
opposition from Spain on his trip to New Orleans to take possession under the recent treat.
Letter from Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to James Wilkinson (Oct. 31, 1803), in id. at
97-98.
87. Act of Feb. 24, 1804, ch. 13, § 11, 2 Stat. 251, 254.
88. 4 I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON 198 (1953).
89. See, e.g., Memorandum to Cabinet (Aug. 12, 1808), in II WRIrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 58, at 42-43; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Bowdoin, Minister to France,
(Apr. 2, 1807), in 6 BOWDOIN AND TEMPLE PAPERS 371-73 (66 Mass. Hist. Soc'y Coll., 7th ser.
1907).
90. Letter from William Claiborne to Secretary of State Robert Smith (Mar. 19, 1809), in 4
OFFICIAL LETTER BOOKS OF W.C.C. CLAIBORNE, 1801-1816, at 333 (D. Rowland ed. 1917).
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of a "Convention of Delegates," at which "every part of the District as far at
least as the Perdido be represented." He urged Wykoff "to prepare for the
occasion the minds of the more influential characters in the vicinity of
Mobile," keeping "this letter as confidential."'
The available evidence overwhelmingly proves that Claiborne's letter and
plan were authorized by the President, as Claiborne himself reportedly
claimed on June 20, in a letter to Governor David Holmes of the Mississippi
Territory.92 Thus, also on June 20, Secretary of State Smith wrote to Wykoff,
officially authorizing his mission."3 On July 17, Madison wrote Smith concern-
ing a letter Smith had sent him from Governor Holmes. Madison said Holmes
should be encouraged to continue his reports, and to keep his militia ready in
case "of foreign interference with W.F. or of internal convulsions." He then
concluded by asking Smith: 'Will it not be advisable to apprize Gov. H. confi-
dentially, of the course adopted as to W.F. and to have his co-operation in
diffusing the impressions we wish to be made there?." 4 Though no response
from Smith to Madison has been found, Smith wrote again to Holmes on July
21, passing on Madison's instructions regarding the militia. In order that
Holmes "be fully apprized of the course adopted as to the Floridas," Smith
added, "and therefore the better able to co-operate in diffusing the impres-
sion we wish to make there, I deem it proper to send you the enclosed copy
of instruction . . . and extracts of a letter from Governor Claiborne to Col.
William Wykoff, written under a sanction from the President. . . . The in-
structions contained in this letter are entirely confidential," he added, "and
are to be executed in a manner the least calculated to incite alarm.""5
Events proceeded in accordance with the administration's plan. The rebels
called a convention with delegates from the entire area, adopted a constitu-
tion, declared their independence, and invited the United States to assume
control. At that point, however, Madison realized that to accept the rebels'
invitation would constitute an act of war against Spain, and would implicitly
suggest an abandonment of America's claim to the area. He therefore issued a
proclamation on October 27, 1810, declaring that events in West Florida had
made it necessary that the United States exercise its right to the territory, and
ordering Claiborne to assume control of certain areas. 96 The proclamation
recited that the area would be held subject to negotiations with Spain, but
when Madison revealed its issuance to Congress, well over one month later,
he urged that the territory be accepted into "the bosom of the American
91. 5id. at 31-33.
92. See Padgett, The West Florida Revolution of 1810, 21 LA. HIST. Q. 177 n.227 (1938), report-
ing that Claiborne wrote Holmes that he had persuaded President Madison to accept his plan.
93. 9 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 86, at 883-84.
94. 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 105-06 (G. Hunt ed. 1908).
95. DOMESTIC LETTERS OF DEP'T OF STATE, Nat'l Archives microfilm, M-40, reel 13.
96. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 465-66 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
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family." :" Irving Brant correctly notes that, by keeping the proclamation se-
cret until it had been implemented, Madison was able to present Spain, Brit-
ain, and France with a fait accompli. 9 But one must add that he thereby
presented the same accomplished fact to Congress as well.
The takeover of West Florida led to some interesting debates in Congress
on its legality and propriety. Henry Clay termed it "propitious," and said that,
had Madison failed to act, "he would have been criminally inattentive to the
dearest interests of this country.""" Senator Outerbridge Horsey unhappily
predicted that, before the close of the session, a bill might well be introduced
to take possession of East Florida as well.'"" Clay hardly regarded this possibil-
ity as utnwvelcome, declaring his "hope to see, ere long, the new United States
• ..embracing not only the old thirteen States, but the entire country east of
the Mississippi, including East Florida, and some of the territories to the
north of us also."'''
B. East Florida
Horsey's prediction was fulfilled sooner than even he expected. On
January 3, 1811, Madison communicated "in confidence" letters from Vicente
Folch, Spanish Governor of the Floridas, indicating Folch's conditional resolve
to deliver "this province to the United States under an equitable capitulation."
Madison recommended "a declaration that the United States could not see,
without serious inquietude," the transfer of East Florida "from the hands of
Spain into those of any other foreign Power." He also asked Congress to au-
thorize him "to take temporary possession of any part or parts of the said
territory," if voluntarily surrendered, and left it to "the wisdom of Congress"
to determine "how far it may be expedient to provide for the event of a
subversion of the Spanish authorities within the territory in question, and an
apprehended occupancy thereof by any other foreign Power.' 2..
Madison's message made East rather than West Florida the chief subject of
the Senate's further deliberations. He gave the impression by this message
that he was treating East Florida very differently than he had treated West
Florida. His actions in West Florida could be justified as based on a claim to
that territory, whereas the United States had made no claim to East Florida.
In reality, and unknown to Congress, the administration had sought to
bring about an internal upheaval in East Florida at the same time it did so in
the western area. On the same day that Smith made Wykoff a special agent
97. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 13 (1810).
98. 5 1. BRANT, supra note 88, at 189. See also id. at 500-01, discussing Madison's failure to call
back Congress earlier than scheduled.
99. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 62 (1810).
100. Id. at 45.
101. Id.at64.
102. Id. at 125-52, 1259.
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for West Florida, he asked Senator William Crawford of Georgia to pick
another agent to bring about the same result in East Florida.1,"3 Crawford
picked George Mathews, who actively pursued his task. With this background,
we can appreciate more completely why Madison asked for authority to take
East Florida in the event of internal "subversion."
Congress passed the declaration Madison sought, but did not authorize a
takeover for internal subversion. The act passed did, however, allow a
takeover of any territory surrendered by agreement of the "local authorities,"
a phrase significantly more general than the surrender from Spain that Madi-
son had mentioned in his message.14
Once Congress acted, Madison formally appointed Mathews as commis-
sioner to negotiate the capitulation of East Florida. Military personnel in the
area were ordered to cooperate with him. 15 When the Spanish finally refused
to cede the area, Mathews sought to achieve his objective by encouraging a
revolt. He reported on August 3, 1811 to Monroe, by then Secretary of State,
that the inhabitants were ripe for revolt, but unable "to effect a thorough
revolution without external aid." He suggested channeling arms to them from
local American troops, and promised to "use the most discreet management
to prevent the United States being committed."1 6 Monroe received Mathews'
letter, but chose not to reply. Mifthews then went ahead with his plan, and
provided both arms and men to the so-called "patriots." He arranged to follow
the patriots across West Florida, helping them take over each post, and then
receiving the post from them as the "local authorities." Mathews apparently
hoped thereby to comply with the letter of his instructions and with the law
passed by Congress at Madison's request. 10 7
The patriots took control of several posts, including Amelia Island, which
they dutifully turned over to Mathews. But the refusal of a local American
officer to cooperate prevented them from taking St. Augustine. At this point,
in April 1812, the administration determined that Mathews was a liability and
removed him. Monroe claimed that Mathews had exceeded his instructions,"08
yet he picked the Governor of Georgia, David B. Mitchell, as Mathews' re-
103. Letter from Robert Smith to William Crawford (June 20, 1810), in DOMESTIC LETTERS OF
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 95, at M-40, reel 13. When Smith heard that Crawford had chosen
Mathews, he wrote taking "great pleasure" in assuring Crawford that the President was "perfectly
satisfied" with Crawford's choice; Mathews, he added, "well understanding the views of the ex-
ecutive, cannot but be happy in promoting them." Letter from Robert Smith to William Crawford
(Oct. 2, 1810), in id.
104. Act ofJan. 15, 1811, 3 Stat. 471.
105. Letters from Secretary of War William Eustis to Brigadier General Wade Hampton and
Colonel Thomas Cushing, respectively (Jan. 24, 1811), in LETTERS SENT BY SECRETARY OF WAR
RELATING TO MILITARY AFFAIRS (1800-1889), Nat'l Archives microfilm, M-6, reel 5.
106. FLORIDA TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF DEP'T OF STATE, Nat'l Archives microfilm, M-1 16, reel 1.
107. J. PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1812, at 101 (3d ed. 1957).
108. Letter from James Monroe to George Mathews (Apr. 4, 1812), in 3 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 572 (1832).
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placement. Mitchell was openly committed to the acquisition of East Florida,
and reacted strongly to the suggestion in Monroe's instructions that the area
taken by Mathews would have to be surrendered.1 9 Monroe in effect assured
him that a withdrawal was not intended, since he made it conditional on a
guarantee of the safety of the patriots."" Colonel Ralph Isaacs, who carried
messages between Monroe and Mathews, wrote to Monroe in July 1814 (as
part of an application for payment) that "when you had finish'd your instruc-
tions to Gov'r. Mitchell after reading the 'sine qua non' that render'd the resto-
ration of the Province utterly impracticable, you said to me-Gov'r. Mitchell
will understand this wont he? to which 1 replied-he is not dull of com-
prehension Sir! ...Nor can you forget," Isaacs added, "that at every inter-
view I was assured that government were concerting (to use your own words)
measures to keep the Province & save harmless the Patriots.
' ' 11
In fact, Mitchell stayed in East Florida. Madison sought legislative ap-
proval of the occupation, but the Senate narrowly denied authority. 1 2 Mon-
roe was disappointed, but wrote to Mitchell that the earlier act still applied,
and the occupation continued."' The administration then decided to move in
earnest to take over the entire area. General William Pinckney was appointed
to replace Mitchell, and the local garrisons were reinforced for offensive
action." 4 Among the new units was one under the command of Andrew Jack-
son, who assured Monroe that his men had "no constitutional scruples," and
were eager to take the province."1
5
Madison and Monroe sought once more to obtain Congress' approval to
assume control of East Florida. Once again, the Senate balked, though they
did authorize the take-over of Mobile, then in Spanish hands."' Even after
109. Mitchell had written to Secretary of War William Eustis on April 20, 1812, urging the
government to adopt a "prompt and decisive course" in East Florida, and pledging his state's
zealous cooperation. J. PRATT, supra note 107, at 117-18. See his reaction to Monroe's letter of
appointment (May 2, 1812), in FLORIDA TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 106, at M-116, reel 2.
110. He made explicit his earlier suggestion that Mitchell was not to withdraw the troops
"unless you find that it may be done consistently with their safety." Letter from James Monroe to
David Mitchell (May 27, 1812), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 108, at 573.
111. Letter from Ralph Isaacs to James Monroe (July 3, 1814), in Misc. LETTERS OF DEP'T OF
STATE, Nat'l Archives microfilm, M-179, reel 30.
112. The bill was defeated in the Senate, fourteen to sixteen. 23 ANNALS OF CONG. 326 (1812).
113. The "authority of the Executive remains unchanged," he said. He continued that the
President thought it "most advisable" that the troops be withdrawn, but added conditions and
said that the administration would probably ask Congress for authority to take possession in the
next session. Letter from James Monroe to David Mitchell (July 6, 1812), in 9 STATE PAPERS AND
PUBLICK DOCUMENTS OF THE U.S. 161-64 (T. Wait ed. 1817). Mitchell replied that various circum-
stances made it impossible to withdraw the troops, and Monroe did not answer. Letter from
David Mitchell to James Monroe (July 17, 1812), in id. at 164-65.
114. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Pinckney (Dec. 8, 1812), in id. at 188-91; Letter
from William Eustis, Secretary of War to Thomas Pinckney (Dec. 2, 1812), in J. PRATT, supra note
107, at 211, 217.
115. 1 J. PARTON, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 372 (1860).
116. The vote was nineteen to sixteen against authorizing the President to take possession of
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this further rejection of administration policy, Monroe would have preferred
at least to hold the territory acquired by Mathews. The issue became part of
the negotiations to settle the War of 1812, however, and Madison finally or-
dered a withdrawal at the insistence of the American negotiators.1 17
Much more remains to be said about executive war making, especially
under Monroe. The full story of each adventure is unnecessary for present
purposes. In general, though, it can be said that the early Presidents con-
tinued aggressively and secretly to work to acquire territory in the South and
West. The great negotiated acquisition of the Adams-Onis Treaty was largely
the prodluct of pressure placed upon Spain through the legislatively unau-
thorized Seminole War.1" 8
CONCLUSION
The presidency was powerful, in a very modern sense, by the end of
George Washington's administration. During those eight years, many of the
practices we associate with executive power generally, and more particularly
in foreign affairs, were established, and with a high degree of awareness as to
the potential consequences. By 1800, John Adams had intentionally led the
nation into its first major war without seeking a formal declaration. Jefferson
and the Republicans promised change, a return to proper principles and
legislative government. Actually, they expanded executive power, systematized
secrecy in government, and expounded the notion that emergencies justify
departures from the Constitution. The' also succeeded in obtaining the ear-
liest analogue to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and used it as authority for
the nation's first effort to subvert a foreign government from within. Under
Madison, these powers and practices coalesced so that the administration pro-
ceeded secretly and unilaterally to plot and support revolutions in \W\est and
East Florida, and in effect to make war without prior legislative approval.
One is naturally led by all these facts to ask whether anything has changed
since those early' times. Despite the strength and independence of our earlx
Presidents, the answer is definitely yes. Perhaps the most obvious difference is
in rhetoric. Our first Presidents were overtly deferential to Congress, whereas
more recent Chief Executives have been condescending or challenging at best.
More significantly, our early Presidents at no time asserted at least two claims
heard frequently of late. The first is that the President ma' use whatever raw
power he has-monetary, diplomatic and military-in the national interest.
Even Jefferson's rationale for escaping the Constitution reqluired an
East Florida. 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 130 (1813). The bill authorizing possession of Mobile passed
within days. Id. at 132.
117. See J. PRATT, supra note 107, at 236.
118. This point is generally supported in S. BEMIS, JOHN QuIINcy ADAMS AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLim, 313-16 (1956). See also the specific suggestion that
territory taken be retained to help in later bargaining with Spain. 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS 35-36 (C. Adams ed. 1875); W. CRESSON, JAMES MONROE 297-99 (1946).
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emergency. The second is that the President's so-called inherent powers as
Chief Executive and Commander in Chief do not merely authorize actions in
the absence of legislative directions, but are beyond legislative control. No
early President suggested that Congress was significantly limited in the control
it potentially had over assigned executive powers. The Supreme Court, in
fact, upheld the legality of undeclared war because Congress had chosen to
proceed in that manner, not because of any executive power. Furthermore,
the Court specifically declared that Congress could control the conduct of war
even to a high degree, and that when it did so the executive acted unlawfully
if it exceeded the legislature's limits.'' 9 In the area of executive privilege, by
analogy, though early Presidents claimed authority to withhold information,
they never asserted that Congress lacked constitutional power to use whatever
means at its disposal to compel production of the information involved, or to
punish for its nonproduction.
Another, more substantive, difference is found in the conduct of our early
Presidents. In questioning the hypothesis that the framers deferred to legisla-
tive power, I have stressed their initiatives and the least deferential aspects of
their conduct. The full picture contains very substantial evidence of their con-
cern for both the legislative and the popular will. Washington implemented
neutrality, for example, with great caution, to appear evenhanded in treating
Britain and France.' 24" Adams avoided a declaration of wvar, but sought legisla-
tive authority at each stage in the nation's movement toward war with France.
Jefferson conducted diplomacy with vigor and secrecy, but moved conserva-
tively in military matters, even when he could have claimed that Congress had
approved a full-scale military effort to take West Florida. Madison and Mon-
roe defy simplification; but it can be said of their adventures in the Floridas
that the'v were pursuing popular objectives with minimal commitment of ma-
terial and military resources. Their efforts cannot be equated with the tun-
po)ular, massive engagements in Korea and Vietnam. Furthermore, the fact
that they acted in secret strongly suggests that they regarded their own ac-
tivities as constitutionally questionable if not improper, and deprives those
activities of the precedential weight they, might have had if full\, revealed to
Congress.
Despite the vigor and initiative of the early Presidents, a case can there-
fore be made for the constitutional impropriety of at least some aspects of
recent presidential rhetoric and conduct. But the nation's history suggests that
119. The two most important cases are Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804); and
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 110 (1814), discussed in L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at
96.
120. An excellent instance of Washington's conduct is his decision to adopt a nautical bound-
ary for the United States that all nations had accepted. In this way, he avoided controversy, and
left it for Congress to go further. See 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, sUpra note 28, at 440-41.
He said in his message to Congress when they reconvened that they, in effect, had the final say
on neutrality and the system he had begun to implement. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 10, 11 (1793).
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the price of pressing this case too far may be great. The presidency has
served as the focal point of this nation's aspirations. What Samuel Huntington
said of the twentieth century is no less true of the first forty years:
"[W]henever the American political system has moved systematically with re-
spect to public policy, the direction and the initiative have come from the
White House." '' The notion that Congress should become more involved in
making and implementing foreign policy is unassailable in theory. But Con-
gress has consciously chosen other roles for itself, and may continue to do so.
To enable Congress to increase its foreign policy role significantly would re-
quire fundamental revisions in the legislature's decision-making apparatus, as
well as in the attitudes of individual legislators.' 22 In short, without executive
leadership we may have no leadership at all.
We can, of course, take this analysis one step further. So what if we lack
"secrecy, despatch, and decision" in foreign affairs? These characteristics may
have been confidently advanced as crucial to an effective executive in 1787, 123
but they remind many Americans today that our recent Presidents have been
duplicitous, rash, and dogmatic. An allocation of governmental authority that
facilitated geographic acquisitions and international respect between 1789 and
1829, despite our relative weakness, may be outmoded in an era when the
costs of international influence by compulsion have become horrendous and
when we are in danger of seeming brutish rather than wveak. Our principal
contribution to the world today may, as Daniel Bell suggests, be the very con-
stitutionalism that prevents excess in a world that no longer can afford it. 1 24
We no longer need a presidency capable of implementing a foreign policy
based on "manifest destiny" or other outmoded notions. But so long as we
have the power to defend ourselves, or an ally, or a principle, we bear the
responsibility of deciding whether and how to do so. While Congress must be
involved in these decisions, the executive will play an indispensable role in
planning and implementing them until the very structure of American gov-
ernment is changed. Determining the proper extent of the President's role in
this process is the truly difficult question. And we avoid both the question and
its possible answers when we attribute the evils produced by our recent Presi-
dents and Congresses to the violation of imagined norms allegedly established
by the leaders of our constitutional period.
121. Huntington, The Democratic Distemper, 41 PUB. INTEREST 9, 24 (Fall 1975). Huntington
adds: "Probably no development of the 1960's and 1970's has greater import for the future of
American politics than the decline in the authority, status, influence, and effectiveness of the
Presidency." See also R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY (1975).
122. See generally Symposium, Organizing the Government to Conduct Foreign Policy: The Constitutional
Questions, 61 VA. L. REV. 747 (1975): D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
123. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION 107-08 (J. Elliot ed. 1861); THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J.Jay):
id. No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton).
124. Bell, The End of American Exceptionalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 193, 220-22 (Fall 1975).
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